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Introduction
Th e conference, “Migration and Violence: Lessons from 
Colombia to the Americas” was held in Bogotá D.C., 
Colombia at the Pontifi cia Universidad Javeriana on June 29, 
2012. Th e main objective of the conference was to develop 
inter-disciplinary academic research in Central America 
and Mexico regarding the relationship between violence, 
particularly narco-violence, and migration. Th e setting in 
Bogotá D.C. was deliberate as the participants discussed 
how lessons learned from Colombia’s experience with 
narco-induced migration could be leveraged for the benefi t 
of Central America and Mexico. With the participation of 
experts on international migration, government representa-
tives, academics, and civil society, the conference high-
lighted research results and relevant intervention experi-
ence concerning this problem in Colombia, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Mexico.
Th is article presents an analysis of the presentations given 
and the discussions held at the conference. It consists of four 
parts. Th e fi rst section compares the similarities and diff er-
ences regarding migration and violence in Colombia and 
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico. Th e second section 
presents the major epistemological challenges emerging 
from research and models of intervention. Th e third section 
presents the implications of the epistemological challenges 
and their impact on public policy. Th e fourth section con-
cludes with principal lessons from Colombia for research 
and intervention in the problem of violence and migration.
1. Th rough a comparative lens: Th e relationship 
between migration and violence in Colombia, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico
From the 1980s to present, Colombia and the region com-
prised of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico have experi-
enced periods of armed internal confl ict, gang-related 
aggression, and community violence which have produced 
forced migrations.1 While each country has encountered 
similar types of problems, each has experienced them at 
diff erent times or at diff erent levels of intensity. Th is has led 
each country to consider diff erent forms of public policy to 
resolve the problem.2
Internal displacement generated by armed internal 
confl icts
Th e armed internal confl icts between the left ist guerillas, 
the government, and other paramilitary structures were 
marked by gross violations of human rights and breaches of 
international humanitarian law that generated large fl ows 
of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). In El 
Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua during the 1980s and 
mid-1990s about three million people were displaced and 
forced to fi nd refuge in another part of the region or fl ed 
to the United States.3 Colombia has reported that from 
the late 1980s to present, there have been 4–5.5 IDPs and 
400,000 refugees4, the majority of whom have made their 
way to neighboring countries.5 In both cases, the humani-
tarian crises have had regional aspects characterized by 
131
Volume 29 Refuge Number 1
restrictions pertaining to the protection of refugees in host 
countries.
In the Central American region, a set of peace agreements 
in the mid-1990s outlined a solution that worked to aid the 
return of a large portion of refugees and IDPs. However, in 
Colombia, the peace agreements signed in the 1990s did not 
obtain the commitment of all guerilla groups. As a result, 
the country still experiences violence and the return of inter-
nally displaced persons has been impeded, as the situation 
does not guarantee property restitution to the victims. Even 
though the country had implemented measures to ensure 
restitution in 1997, it has not been met with much success 
as guerilla groups continue to inhibit the implementation of 
these agreements. Likewise, extended eff orts made in 2005 
and 2011 by transitional justice frameworks recognized the 
rights of the IDPs in their condition as victims to truth, to 
justice, reparation, and to the guarantee that said events 
would not occur again. However, these measures have not 
been fully implemented and do not seem to identify the root 
of the problem. Unfortunately, sixty individuals6, who had 
taken it upon themselves to lead other victims in hope of 
exercising their rights, have been killed in recent years.7
Mexico emerged as a scene of political violence in the 
1990s with the surge of Zapatista guerillas and paramilitary 
groups that were repressed by the government. Most of the 
violence occurred in southern Mexico and generated high 
levels of internal displacement of indigenous peoples in this 
area.
Th e political violence behind social and economic con-
fl icts in Colombia, Guatemala, and El Salvador persisted 
despite the peace agreements signed in the two regions. 
Problems such as social exclusion, poverty, uneven distri-
bution of land and wealth, and political corruption were 
not addressed by the aforementioned agreements and con-
tinued to neutralize any progress made.
Forced Migration and Organized Crime
In El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, and Colombia, violence 
and the frequent outbreak of organized crime have trig-
gered forced migration and have victimized international 
migrants. In the fi rst two countries mentioned, continuities 
exist from confl ict to post-confl ict periods as both coun-
tries have felt the impact of transnational crime8 on forced 
migration. In the last fi ve years, following the peace accords, 
there has been a notable increase in migration. Organized 
crime in these four countries is composed not only by pri-
vate armies engaged in illegal economic activity but also 
by the civil sector, military, police, businessmen, and polit-
icians of diff erent parties.
Meanwhile, violence in Mexico has been exacerbated 
to the extent that 60,000 causalities9 have been reported 
in the last six years, with consequences for forced migra-
tion. On one hand, this has initiated an invisible refugee 
process made up of middle and upper class people fl eeing 
to the United States and Canada, seeking protection. On 
the other hand, this has created internal displacement of 
those belonging to lower socio-economic classes without 
the monetary means to leave the country. Th ese internally 
displaced persons (IDPs), estimated at 270,000, have been 
visible10, as they have taken advantage of the shelters that 
have been erected by their municipalities.
Organized crime in Mexico has also victimized inter-
national migrants trying to reach the United States. In addi-
tion to being victims of human traffi  cking, migrants are 
vulnerable to attacks by Mexican cartels seeking to prevent 
the use of corridors that they have deemed most vital to 
the transit of illegal drugs, illicit money, and weapons. Th e 
network of corridors secures their transactions, allowing 
them to gain more economic stability and to place them in a 
position to seize more political power. Aside from taunting 
migrants who are attempt to use the corridors, the cartels 
monitor corridor gateways and demand money from the 
migrants’ families who are waiting to help their relatives 
on the other side. Although this has reduced the amount of 
illegal immigration, it has increased the number of kidnap-
pings of undocumented migrants.
In Guatemala for example, there is evidence that drug 
traffi  cking and money laundering have compromised the 
judicial system, which has contributed to the corruption of 
the banking system and entrepreneurship. Th e pharmaceut-
ical industry, especially, has been targeted for its develop-
ment of new synthetic drugs. In Mexico, there is the per-
ception among a few sectors that the Federal government 
should have pursued the Gulf Cartel and the Zetas more 
than the Sinaloa cartel.
In relation to the visibility of these problems in public 
policy, the developments in Central America and Mexico 
arise mainly because authorities refuse to recognize the 
gravity of the situation. Th ere are laws recognizing refugees 
from other countries but there are no laws that recognize 
the existence of internally displaced persons. However, the 
process to create a law for these victims is being discussed in 
Mexico. Th e repressive policy facing international migrants 
traveling through Mexico trying to reach the United States 
has been reduced, but it has been accompanied by a lack 
of protection against threats from organized crime. In 
Colombia, the institutional response to forced migration 
by violence has attracted a high level of expertise in the 
legal and institutional framework and has been able to pro-
duce tangible achievements not seen before in the case of 
victims’ rights. Although state-sponsored responses have 
been low among the four countries, the Catholic Church 
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and multiple NGOs have compensated for this by paying 
particular attention to the rights of migrants and displaced 
peoples.
In the case of Colombia, crime has intertwined with, and 
strengthened, the armed internal confl ict under the guise 
of paramilitary counterinsurgency, making it one of the 
major drivers of forced displacement. In the background 
of organized crime in Colombia, there exists the dispute of 
over control of legal and illegal sources of economic resour-
ces in the territories such as mining, drug traffi  cking and 
public budgets.11
Th e fact that these groups have evolved by contracting 
integral control over territories through violent mediums 
refl ects their desire to gain political power that includes 
control of everyday life while using methods that diff er 
from guerrilla groups also present in Colombia. In these 
situations, these zones are managed in an authoritarian 
matter and have led to the displacement of people who 
do not follow the governance imposed within the violent 
and hegemonic areas. As far as human traffi  cking is con-
cerned, Colombia is a country of origin, transit, and des-
tination where the main victims are women and children. 
Th e women tend to be the heads of households and are, on 
average, between 18–24 years old. Th ose of African descent 
and the indigenous are among the most vulnerable.
In Central America and Mexico, there are no fi gures 
representing the magnitude and the characteristics of this 
new cycle of forced migrations due to violence in recent 
years. Meanwhile, Colombia has registered substantial 
improvements in systematizing information regarding 
displacement from state, church, and non-governmental 
sources, however problems still exist with underreporting.
Forced Migration, Community Violence, and Young 
People
In both regions, the relationship between migration, organ-
ized crime, community violence and youth are closely 
related.
In Colombia, the most powerful criminal organizations 
control sectors of cities through its coordination with juven-
ile neighborhood gangs and local or micro local outreach. 
Correspondingly, the forced recruitment of young boys, 
girls, and adolescents is one of the main eff ects of internal 
displacement within the country.
Left ist guerillas recruit young people and minors, those 
who reside in rural and poor zones that have been neglected 
by the government, to their ranks. Similarly, new paramil-
itary groups recruit and utilize the youth community to 
increase their range of criminal activity in both rural and 
urban areas. Th e minors that have been linked to non-gov-
ernmental armed groups are legally recognized as victims 
although they are victimizers as well. Lastly, IDPs fl eeing 
from political violence in the countryside to cities are fre-
quently victims of community violence in the zones where 
the heads of the gangs and dealers of hallucinogens are 
located.
In the case of Central America the large cartels have con-
tributed to the scope and phenomena transnational crime 
where “maras” like “Salvatrucha” and “18” stand out and 
have established their presence in California in the United 
States. Th e spread of these gangs across international bor-
ders—Mexico, and of the Central American Triangle, par-
ticularly El Salvador—is in itself a product of the dynam-
ics of migration, refuge, and deportations. In Guatemala, 
organized crime related to narcotics controls the gangs and 
uses repressive measures to legitimize itself among civil 
society, replacing the state’s function as protector and regu-
lator of the populace.
2. Epistemological challenges for understanding 
the relationship between migration and violence.
Th e experience of violence and migration in these four 
countries presents various valuable, but complex, epistemo-
logical challenges to understanding the links between vio-
lence and migration.
Broadening the conceptual range of migration categories 
and addressing current violence
Given the implications that conceptual categories for under-
standing migration have for the protection of migrants, 
overcoming the conceptual shortcomings of current cat-
egories used to describe migration induced by violence was 
one of the principal challenges identifi ed by conference 
participants.
Although various adjectives, including political, eco-
nomic, social, and cultural, are used to generate understand-
ings of migration on micro and macro levels, care should be 
taken not to lose sight of the instances where these categor-
ies intersect or overlap. Th is points to the need to restructure 
the traditional categories of migration beyond the classifi ca-
tion of refugee, IDPs, human traffi  cking, economic, natural 
disaster-related, and “mixed fl ows”. If there is a situation of 
mixed fl ows wherein migrants do not fi t into any pre-deter-
mined category, they face the possibility of being catalogued 
as an illegal immigrant in the country of destination where 
they will be refused rights and where there is no framework 
of protection made available to them.
Several solutions were discussed in response to the above 
mentioned problems, including: extending the existing 
categories, creating new categories that are more inclusive 
that cannot have universal validation claims but are com-
mensurate to regional and local diff erences, and responsive 
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instances of varying nature within their countries and other 
countries.
An interdisciplinary view of migration and information 
systems
Th e second biggest challenge discussed was the develop-
ment of an interdisciplinary view on migration that takes 
into account diff erent focal points of research such as wars, 
armed confl ict, the economy, state mafi as, transnational 
organized crime, drug traffi  cking, gangs, maras, poverty, 
inequality, and exclusion. In this sense, moving towards 
a more complete identifi cation of the range and nature 
of novel research in this area, one that implements more 
robust methodologies, is important. Each country should 
defi ne short, medium, and long-term research agendas that 
are key in the development of academic research groups and 
that strengthen the dialogue on the research and interven-
tion, given that public policy does not always feed off  of the 
developments made within research.
Among what has been prioritized in research, there are 
a few that stand out signifi cantly: the return of migrants 
is a major part of diff erent agendas concerning migration 
policies, including, for example, landholding. Another top 
priority is the research on the migration of women, chil-
dren, afro-ethnic groups, and indigenous people due to 
the vulnerability that these groups face during migration 
and the lack of attention these cases receive. Collecting 
the stories of those who have been abused and victimized, 
especially stories from young gang members that have been 
a part of induced migrations is also a priority as they are 
seen as victims of domestic violence and have been robbed 
of economic opportunities, etc. Although there is a lack 
of academic work in the area, displacement that occurs 
along the borders has been given much attention. Similarly, 
it is necessary to advance the study of human traffi  cking 
focusing on public health, sexual and reproductive rights, 
beyond criminal acts. It is necessary to understand how 
violence can take many diff erent forms and how these 
forms intersect to generate migrations; for example, the 
violence of powerful organized groups such as those who 
traffi  c drugs, their relations with offi  cial forces, and the 
blurred instances of community violence domestically and 
among the youth. Th e study of crime strategy and how 
armed groups control territories and achieve their object-
ives is also given high priority. Furthermore, the methods 
in which they combine silent and invisible forms of con-
trol using strategic information pertaining to the territor-
ies and the use of extreme demonstrations of violence and 
massacres. Additionally, it is of high priority to study the 
drug transportation routes within the United States that 
are normally conceived in Mexico.
Equally, it is important to improve the production and 
systematization of quantitative and qualitative data that 
allows the systematic study of migration and also allows 
public policy to monitor and address these studies. Th is is 
a great endeavor due to the diff erent forms of forced migra-
tion that take place, especially when considering that they 
are not readily seen and oft en occur in secret. In Colombia, 
considerable advancements have been made to track forced 
displacement; however, information about destination 
points do not exist as Colombia lacks the secondary sources 
to keep a record of migrants once they have fl ed. Other 
occurrences that are associated with migration such as ref-
uge, traffi  cking, and victimization suff er from systematic 
methodologies and are not as well documented. Meanwhile, 
systematic fi gures representing forced migrations due to 
current violence have been recorded in Central America 
and Mexico.
3. Implications for Public Policy
In regards to the violent actors that generate migration, the 
states should establish an area that is committed to the pro-
tection of rights and that manages the aff ects of such vio-
lence in the lives of the victims. Notwithstanding, the form 
in which the phenomena related to migration is defi ned and 
classifi ed also determines the scope of national and inter-
national regimes in protecting the rights of the migrants. In 
other words, conceptual and methodological discussion to 
understand and classify forced migration is a political dis-
cussion in order to construct laws, institutions and establish 
priorities and applicable areas for public policies.
It is recognized that the tools to prevent new actors from 
impacting migration are lacking from public policy. Human 
rights laws provide the tools to violations within the state 
as international humanitarian law and transitional justice 
are meant to control non-state actors that want to become 
offi  cial state actors. However, tools are needed to control 
the actors today that have the dual ability of producing new 
orders without attempting to replace the state but can cap-
ture the state from “within” and to face the companies that 
are linked to grand violations of rights that have been regu-
lated as of today.
Th e same issue arises with narco-traffi  ckers, actors for 
which there are few tools or methods of engagement other 
than the criminal justice system. However, we fi nd that the 
drug traffi  cker has certain capacity of governance, of ter-
ritorial ordinance, and the ability to restructure econom-
ics, and so the question remains, how do you make peace 
with the drug traffi  ckers aft er or beyond criminalization? In 
Colombia, there has been negotiation with the drug traffi  ck-
ing network disguised as political peace negotiations and, 
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as a result, former narco-traffi  ckers have become legitimate 
political actors.
Colombia is also illustrative of the consequences gen-
erated by forced displacement such punishable crime in 
regards to the attribution of penal and civil responsibilities. 
Th e traditional attribution of culpability to an individual that 
has generated forced displacement has been transcended by 
more systematic approaches to the consequences of crime. 
Th e Colombian approach to dealing with the loss of land by 
victims of crime is the best example of this trend. Colombia 
also faces the challenge of determining whether displace-
ment took place due to political violence or other types of 
violence, diff erentiating the infractions of international 
humanitarian law within the framework of armed internal 
confl ict, mass violations of human rights, generalized vio-
lence, and/or of internal strife and unrest. From the above, 
the classical distinctions within political violence and vio-
lence due to common organized crime do not appear to 
function adequately in all cases in order to account for the 
political nature of local actors like narcotraffi  ckers, to the 
extent that it also groups diverse legal actors like offi  cials 
and businessmen that seek to control political, economic, 
and social relations that are woven together in a territory.
In this sense, the Ley de Victimas y Restitución de Tierras 
or “Th e Law of Victims and Land Restitution” issued in 
2011 in Colombia represents a setback in the recognition of 
rights of victims of displacement. Furthermore, the scope of 
protection for those who have been displaced due to fumi-
gations, the victims of so-called emerging gangs, the vic-
tims who sough refuge abroad, and collective victims such 
as labor unions, as well as those who are a part of social 
movements and opposing parties. Th e economic activities 
in rural areas like mega-mining and the cultivation of agro-
combustibles, among others, have raised questions as to 
how they can fi nance non-state armed groups that create 
new cycles of displacement.
It is important to advance a regional approach to migra-
tion and violence while taking into account the links 
between similar situations that exist within these countries 
in fi elds such as the regulation of illicit activities, the validity 
of peace, the development of democracy and the defence of 
human rights, regional integration and security, the state’s 
presence through preventative policy, social and economic 
development, regulated economies and social institutions. 
If there exists globalized crime, the states should face the 
situation based on an integrated perspective through pre-
ventative policy.
Facing international migration, it is necessary to insist 
that states disassociate migration policy from national 
security because this convergence can aff ect the rights of 
the migrants that need protection.
It is also necessary that public policy on migration 
advance to adopt a management and indicator system that 
produces results permitting interested parties to monitor 
and control the situation through an interdisciplinary dia-
logue concerning rights and the economy.
4. Conclusions: Lessons from Colombia for the 
Americas
By and large, Central America and Mexico can learn from 
the case in Colombia. Th e adoption of a special institution 
tending to victims of complex situations of violence is linked 
to the process of peace negotiations as a way to resolve situa-
tions of grave violence.
Th e complexity of the violence in Colombia coalesces 
ideological armed internal confl ict with armed disputes 
among apparatuses of power that combine illegal action 
with legal action in all aspects of their functioning. With 
respect to organized crime, it is another area where Central 
America and Mexico should further characterize the actual 
situations of humanitarian crisis, overcoming the narrow-
ness of the categories defi ning migration and the analysis of 
traditional violence.
Considering that young people are frequently recruited 
by various armed organizations, they are their principal 
victims. Th e states should prioritize preventative policies 
beyond distinctly repressive policy. Likewise, they should 
provide specialized protection to women, children, and 
ethnic groups who are traditionally excluded, like those of 
indigenous and afro descent.
Similarly, the experience of multi-track analysis of 
migration and peace processes highlights the importance 
of considering diff erent levels of incidence and negotiation. 
Th is involves not only states and international actors, but 
also social groups of distinct classes including fl exible asso-
ciations of social organizations, universities, churches and 
other authority fi gures. Th e aforementioned is key to face 
regional integration among the countries, their authorities, 
their social organizations, and citizens to agree on investi-
gative agendas and intervention facilitating exchange and 
joint lessons about the complicated relations among migra-
tion and violence in the Americas.
Th ey can also nourish themselves with the wealth of aca-
demic publications and research coming from Colombia 
concerning migration, violence, forced displacement, infor-
mation tracking systems, and the adoption of public policy 
indicators tracking the eff ectiveness of rights.
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Notes
 1. El Salvador and Guatemala, together with Honduras, com-
prise what is known as the “Northern Triangle” of Central 
America and share the same regional dynamic with Mexico
 2. In this context, both regions at the same time or another, 
have been considered the most violent places on earth: 
Colombia in the 1980s and the 1990s; Mexico, in combina-
tion with the Northern Triangle in the 2000s till now.
 3. Casasfranco Roldan and Maria Virginia, Las Migraciones y 
los Desplazamientos Forzados: Análisis Comparativo e Inte-
gral Desde un Enfoque de Derechos Humanos (San José de 
Costa Rica, 2001).
 4. CODHES, “Desplazamiento Creciente y Crisis Humani-
taria Invisibilizada,” en Codhes Informa (Bogotá: CODHES, 
2012).
 5. At the forefront of forced displacement, women and chil-
dren continue to be the principal victims due to their 
vulnerability and exposure to sexual violence within the 
community or familial. Th ey suff er not only because of the 
armed internal confl ict but also due to do everyday life in 
an unprotected state.
 6. Caracol Radio, Junio 12 de 2012. http://www.caracol.com
.co/noticias/judicial/mas-de-60-lideres-de-restitucion-de
-tierras-han-sido-asesinados-en-siete-anos-defensoria-del
-pueblo/20120612/nota/1704578.aspx.
 7. In 2011, the displacement that took place in Colombia con-
tinued and increased to include 73 mass movements. Some 
were generated under counterinsurgency operations, for 
example, the operation commanded under Alfonso Cano 
and the FARC. Additionally, displacements occurred in 
the areas that had been given priority by the government 
and where intervention had been coordinated by military 
command. On the other hand, despite the major blows that 
have dealt to the guerillas, they are far from being defeated 
and the cost of the lives of offi  cial forces is high.
 8. In both cases, organized crime has contributed to drug traf-
fi cking, arms traffi  cking, extortion, election fraud, manipu-
lation of institutions, human traffi  cking, among others.
 9. Miguel Wilchez Hinojosa, “Migration and Violence: Les-
sons from Colombia for the Americas,” Bogotá, 2012. 
 10. Ibid.
 11. Between 1980 and the mid-90s there were sharp disputes 
between large drug cartels that generated displacements, 
the scope of which is undeterminable due to the lack of 
information. Th ese disputes surfaced again in the late-90s 
and early 2000s when the paramilitary group, United Self-
Defense Forces of Colombia, had been formed. Th is con-
tributed to another dispossession of a millions of hectares 
of productive land, the control of production and local 
institutions as well as another wave of forced migration. 
Th ey reconfi gured themselves following the government 
initiative to demobilize paramilitary groups in the fi rst 
decade of the 2000s. Although paramilitary groups have 
been maintained to a certain extent, diff erent criminal 
gangs have begun to emerge focusing on the consolidation 
of control over captured territories.
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